The parties had been in a permanent life partnership for 29 years, cohabited throughout, had two children together, and presented publicly as spouses. The respondent was the primary breadwinner; the applicant was financially dependent and had devoted herself to domestic responsibilities. The partnership terminated in October 2020. The applicant brought an urgent application for interim maintenance pendente lite, relying on an express maintenance undertaking by the respondent and, in the alternative, on reciprocal duties of support arising from a permanent life partnership. The respondent raised jurisdictional objections under Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) and disputed the legal cognisability of a maintenance claim arising from a terminated life partnership.
The Western Cape High Court dismissed the respondent's objections and granted interim maintenance pending finalisation of the matter. The court held that it had ancillary jurisdiction and that Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) cannot be used to avoid material factual disputes where the respondent has not filed an answering affidavit. It was not necessary at the interim stage to finally determine whether an enforceable life partnership with reciprocal duties of support existed. A prima facie right was established on the basis of the duration of the relationship, shared children and household, financial interdependence, public presentation as spouses, and the respondent's history of providing maintenance including post-termination support. The applicant established apprehension of irreparable harm through her financial dependence and the cessation of support, and the balance of convenience favoured preserving the status quo pending trial.
Judgment: 4 March 2026The parties were married under Sharia law in November 2020, automatically out of community of property. The respondent issued a series of talaqs between 2021 and 2022, but the parties continued cohabiting and a child was born during the subsistence of the marriage. Following the Constitutional Court's decision in Women's Legal Centre Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2022] ZACC 23 and the commencement of the Divorce Amendment Act 1 of 2024, the wife instituted civil divorce proceedings in 2023 and simultaneously brought a Rule 43 application for interim maintenance pendente lite. The High Court dismissed the Rule 43 application on the basis that the parties were not "spouses" for Rule 43 purposes because the Muslim marriage had already been terminated by talaq. The wife appealed.
The Full Court upheld the appeal and set aside the jurisdictional ruling. The court held that the dismissal of the Rule 43 application on jurisdictional grounds was appealable as it was final in effect, definitive of the wife's rights, and had disposed of the interim relief sought; section 16(3) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 does not bar an appeal where the merits of the interim relief were never reached and the issue is one of jurisdiction. On the merits of jurisdiction, the court held that the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, as amended by the Divorce Amendment Act 1 of 2024, applies to all Muslim marriages subsisting after 15 December 2014, and that the issuing of a talaq does not preclude a spouse from instituting civil divorce proceedings or invoking Rule 43. The term "spouse" in Rule 43 must be interpreted purposively to include a party to a Muslim marriage, notwithstanding a prior talaq. The parties cannot, by agreement, acquiescence, or submission to religious processes, contract out of or waive the statutory protections of the Divorce Act, including access to interim maintenance. The wife was granted leave to re-enrol the Rule 43 application, and the respondent was ordered to pay costs.
Judgment: 12 March 2026The parties were married out of community of property subject to the accrual system. The wife had two minor children from a previous marriage who had not been adopted by the husband. During the marriage the parties functioned as a single-family unit, the husband provided substantial financial support to the wife and children, and a high standard of living was established. Following separation, the wife brought a Rule 43 application seeking interim maintenance for herself, the two children, and a contribution to legal costs. The High Court ordered the husband to pay interim maintenance for the children (R40,000 per month cash), to retain them on his medical aid, to contribute to housing costs, and to make a substantial contribution to legal costs (R1 million). The husband sought to appeal, limited to the issue of whether he could be ordered to pay interim maintenance for the stepchildren.
The Supreme Court of Appeal struck the appeal from the roll with costs on jurisdictional grounds, declining to reach the merits of whether a stepparent can be ordered to pay interim maintenance for stepchildren. The court held that section 16(3) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 expressly bars appeals against orders concerning maintenance pendente lite. Even where leave to appeal has been granted, the appellate court must determine whether the order constitutes an appealable "decision" under section 16(1)(a), applying the interests of justice test. The Rule 43 order lacked finality; the parties' rights had not been definitively determined; the High Court could reconsider the order under Rule 43(6) or finally determine the issue in the divorce trial. The court emphasised that the correct remedy was a Rule 43(6) variation application or reconsideration in the final divorce proceedings, not an appeal.
Judgment: 11 March 2026The parties were married in 2001 and instituted divorce proceedings in 2024. They had three adult children, all enrolled at university: S (approximately 22) and R (approximately 20) remained financially dependent on the respondent; J (late 20s) had previously lived independently abroad for several years before returning to South Africa and re-enrolling at university. During the marriage the respondent bore most household and educational expenses and maintained a high standard of living. Following separation, the applicant brought a Rule 43 application seeking interim maintenance for herself and all three adult children. The respondent accepted a duty of support toward S and R but refused to contribute toward J, contending that J had previously become self-supporting and had not demonstrated a basis for renewed dependency.
The court reaffirmed that the purpose of Rule 43 is to provide temporary, rough-and-ready relief aimed at preserving the marital standard of living pending divorce, not to correct historic frugality or upgrade lifestyles. The duty of support does not automatically terminate at majority and parents may be ordered to contribute to the maintenance of adult dependent children who are bona fide tertiary students. The court granted interim maintenance for S and R on this basis. Maintenance was refused for J: J had previously become independent and self-supporting while living abroad, and had failed to demonstrate that the renewed dependency arose from involuntary circumstances such as ill-health, disability, or circumstances beyond J's control. There was insufficient evidence of diligent academic effort, credible commitment to studies, or inability to resume self-support. The court noted that a duty of support for a major child may revive in appropriate cases but generally requires proof of involuntary loss of self-support or a genuine, time-bound transitional need.
Judgment: 10 February 2026